China Shared Power Bank Market Analysis 2026: Why 3M Devices — and What It Means for International Franchise Operators
From 2015's "fake demand" to 3 million devices sold in 2025. China's shared power bank boom deconstructed — and what smart franchise operators can learn from it for Southeast Asia, Japan and global expansion.
If you're visiting China for the first time, you'll likely experience something surreal —
Whether it's in shopping malls, restaurants, bars, airports, tourist attractions, or even remote small towns, you can find shared power banks almost everywhere.
They exist like air itself.
💬 So a natural question arises: With so many devices out there, do they actually make money? If not, why keep deploying them?
This question can never be answered by just looking at the results. We must go back to the very beginning, to a stage where almost no one believed this could work.
📅 Chapter 1: 2015 — Something That Looked Like a 'Fake Need'
In 2015, we participated in developing and deploying some of the industry's earliest shared power bank devices, placing them in Shenzhen shopping malls.
At that time, this thing didn't even have a unified name.
⚠️ No one thought it could become a business.
Users' first reactions were:
- ❌ "Why rent? I can just buy one."
- ❌ "Can it be free?"
- ❌ "Is this safe?"
Merchants were even more direct:
- ❌ "This thing takes up space."
- ❌ "How much can you pay me?"
So in the earliest days, what we did was very simple, even somewhat "anti-commercial":
| Strategy | Specific Approach |
|---|---|
| 🆓 Free to use | Zero barrier for users to experience |
| 💰 Extremely low price | 0.5 yuan/hour, barely profitable |
| 🗣️ Massive ground promotion | Explaining product value door-to-door |
| 🎁 Events for trials | Scan QR code for coupons, points |
🎯 Not to make money, but to prove — does anyone actually use this thing?
📈 Chapter 2: 2016-2017: Slowly Gaining Users, But No One Made Money
As devices began appearing in different scenarios, changes slowly emerged:
- ✅ Users started thinking of it when their phones were "about to die"
- ✅ Merchants became willing to try placing one
- ✅ Usage frequency started improving
⚠️ Almost no one was making money. High costs, unstable efficiency, unclear models — this was the norm.
Until 2017, when one thing changed everything.
🚀 Chapter 3: 2017 — We Thought We Had Won
Capital began entering this industry.
At that time, we were actually a bit "confident," even somewhat proud. Because what we secured were what seemed to be the highest-quality locations at the time:
🛁 Bath centers | 🍸 Nightclubs | 🍺 Bars | ✈️ Transportation hubs
💡 Long dwell time, strong spending power, high willingness to pay. As long as we hold these core locations, this business is stable.
⚔️ Chapter 4: Another Approach Emerged — Not "Selecting," But "Covering"
👾 Monster Charging
- No location selection
- Massive deployment
- Volume over quality
⚡ JieDian
- Cover all reachable scenarios
- Everywhere strategy
- Network density first
They were not obsessed with "high-quality locations," but instead began entering in large numbers:
🍜 Restaurants | 🦶 Foot massage shops | 🏨 Small hotels | 🏪 Street-side stores
🎯 Let users see power banks everywhere they go.
💡 Chapter 5: A Truth We Only Truly Understood Later
As devices began densely appearing in cities, a change quietly happened:
Users no longer "looked for power banks,"
Instead —
✨ They got used to their existence.
💡 Quantity leads to quality.
🆚 Chapter 6: Shanghai Comparison — 20 People vs. 200 People
At that time in Shanghai, there was a scenario we still review to this day.
| Comparison | Us | Competitor |
|---|---|---|
| 👥 Team size | 20 people | 200 people |
| 🎯 Location strategy | Curated premium locations | Full coverage |
| 📊 Per-location efficiency | Higher | Lower |
"We're playing efficiency, they just have more people."
🏆 But the result was no surprise — Monster Charging successfully went public.
At that stage, we judged the direction wrong:
- ❌ Once locations are taken, hard to get back
- ❌ Once user habits form, hard to change
- ❌ Once network density falls behind, hard to catch up
🔄 Chapter 7: The Industry Did Not "Collapse," It Diverged
"Too many deployed, not enough demand, the industry is starting to fail."
📉 On One Side: Direct Operations Teams Struggled
| Challenge | Manifestation |
|---|---|
| 🚫 Good locations already taken | Premium scenarios saturated |
| 💪 Merchants becoming stronger | Commission ratios compressed |
| 💸 Costs getting higher | Labor, operations, equipment depreciation |
| 🤝 Negotiations getting harder | Merchants have choices, strong bargaining power |
"Not that we don't want to deploy, we simply can't."
📈 On the Other Side: Agents Began Crazy Expansion
Relying on local relationships, personal networks, and resource exchange — even involving:
🔥 Fire departments | 👮 Police | 🏛️ Local government resources
They took the market piece by piece, "eating it up."
🌍 Chapter 8: A Very Exaggerated Phenomenon
Today, if you go to China:
🏘️ County towns | 🌄 Border areas | ⛰️ Mountain regions
Shared power banks are everywhere.
💡 It's not that there are no locations, but who can secure them.
💰 Chapter 9: The Payback Logic Also Changed
🚀 Early days: 1-2 months to break even
| Payback Period | Assessment |
|---|---|
| ⚡ 6 months | Excellent business |
| 📊 1 year | Mainstream acceptance |
| ✅ 1.5 years | Still healthy |
| 🔄 2 years | Acceptable for traditional owners |
| 🏦 3 years | Finance, payment industries start entering |
🏦 Chapter 10-11: New Players Enter
People from the payment industry began entering — attracted by stable cash flow, replicable models, and scalable expansion.
Then came a much bigger variable:
🦘 Meituan
Before this: Everyone was "negotiating with merchants"
With them: They were already in the merchant system
📊 Market began rapidly concentrating: 50% → 60%
🌀 Chapter 12-14: Why So Many Brands?
But things did not get simpler, they got more complex — brands actually became more numerous. Thousands of shared power bank brands emerged.
The reason is actually very simple:
💎 This business still makes money. Not huge profits, but stable, replicable.
📦 In 2025, the Chinese market still sold nearly 3 million devices.
🔮 Chapter 15-16: What About the Future?
| Trend | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Chinese market | Continued competition, increasingly intense |
| 🏢 Giants | Hitting growth bottlenecks |
| 🔧 Industry | Becoming increasingly refined |
But it won't disappear.
🌏 A Change Already Happening
People start going abroad.
More and more Chinese practitioners are beginning to pay attention to overseas markets:
- ✅ Model already validated
- ✅ Domestic competition too intense
- ✅ Overseas still in early stages
🏆 The Bottom Line
This isn't a business that suddenly appeared, but one that was repeatedly tested, competed, and reconstructed.
It has experienced:
- ❌ Not being understood
- 📈 Crazy expansion
- ⚠️ Decision mistakes
- 🔄 Model reconstruction
- ⚔️ Extreme competition
Finally, it became what you see today — a complete set of already-validated experience.
Interested in the Overseas Market?
JUUGO has 11+ years of experience helping brands enter Southeast Asia, Japan, and Korea.
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